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Abstract
This article provides an empirical analysis of the impact of European Union
(EU) private food safety standards on pesticide use and farm-level productivity
among small-scale vegetable producers in Kenya. We apply an extended three-
stage damage control production framework, accounting for multiple endogene-
ity problems, to farm-level data collected from a random cross-sectional sample
of 539 small-scale producers. Estimation results show that farmers producing
vegetables for the domestic market use signiﬁcantly lower quantities of pesti-
cides than do export farmers. However, contrary to ﬁndings elsewhere, the
econometric evidence here shows that both domestic and export-oriented vegeta-
ble farmers in Kenya use pesticides at levels below the economic optimum. The
results also show that the adoption of standards by export farmers does not
have any signiﬁcant impact on total pesticide use. However, adopter categories
are distinguishable in terms of types of pesticide used, i.e. adopters use safer
pesticides based on World Health Organization (WHO) classiﬁcation. The
third-stage structural revenue model results demonstrate that adoption of
standards has a positive and signiﬁcant impact on revenue raised in vegetable
production. Nevertheless, farmers producing for the export market are indistin-
guishable from those producing for the domestic farmers in terms of the total
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revenue earned from producing vegetables during the rainy season, on a ‘per
acre’ basis. Although standards can potentially prevent resource-poor smallhold-
ers from maintaining their position in the lucrative export markets, they can
also result in positive changes in the production systems of those small-scale
farmers who adopt it, as shown by these results.
Keywords: Damage control; food safety standards; high-value crops; Kenya;
productivity.
JEL classiﬁcations: Q13, Q17.
1. Introduction
Horticultural exports have grown dramatically in many sub-Saharan African
countries while many other agricultural export commodities have faced stagna-
tion and, until very recently, declining world market prices. The Kenyan horti-
cultural export industry has been the most successful and is now by far the
largest exporter of vegetables to the European Union (Government of Kenya,
2006). Vegetable exports have increased rapidly over the last decade,
surpassing coffee – historically, Kenya’s most foreign exchange-earning export
crop – as the nation’s second major source of foreign exchange in the
agricultural sector after tea. The promotion of non-traditional export crops like
horticultural commodities has often been proposed as a pro-poor development
strategy to reduce poverty in many sub-Saharan countries, including Kenya
(Dolan, 2001). In many European countries, what was once a small-scale trade
in Asian vegetables, such as chillies or okra sold to wholesale markets, is now
high volume and dominated by the biggest supermarkets (Dolan, 2001). The
increase in demand for high-value horticultural produce by consumers in devel-
oped countries has encouraged farmers in developing countries to intensify pro-
duction through the increased use of purchased inputs. In horticultural crops,
agrochemical inputs such as pesticides play an important role in meeting the
quality requirements of wholesale and retail agents, i.e. the delivery of produce
with speciﬁc physical attributes, such as colour, shape, size and spotlessness
(Thrupp et al., 1995).
While agrochemical inputs contribute to increased production and improved
quality, high levels of pesticide use have been associated with negative externalities
such as short- and long-term human health effects (Antle and Capalbo, 1994; Antle
and Pingali, 1994; Pingali et al., 1994; Ajayi, 2000; Wilson and Tisdell, 2001); eco-
logical effects on non-target plants and animals (Thrupp et al., 1995; Pimentel and
Greiner, 1997); and damage to soil and water quality of the agro-ecosystem (Pimen-
tel and Greiner, 1997). Increasingly, the prevailing production methods, as well as
maximum pesticide residue limit (MRL) have resulted in food safety and sustain-
ability concerns for both domestic and foreign consumers. Retailers and consumers
in the importing European countries have become increasingly concerned about the
prevailing production methods in the exporting countries. Various rules and regula-
tions have been put in place to protect consumers and farm workers from pesticide
intoxication and restore consumer conﬁdence. The European Union (EU), Kenya’s
major export market, has enacted legislation on traceability, maximum pesticide
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residue limits, and sanitary and phytosanitary requirements. Supermarket chains in
Europe have also developed prescriptive, production-oriented standards, e.g. the
EU Retailers Produce Working Group for Good Agricultural Practices (Global-
GAP),2 which is relevant to growers of fresh fruit and vegetables and requires man-
datory certiﬁcation by an independent and internationally accredited certiﬁcation
body.
The GlobalGAP schemes are based on compliance with four main criteria: food
safety, environmental protection, occupational health and safety, and animal wel-
fare. The food safety criteria are based on the application of Hazard Analysis Criti-
cal Control Point (HACCP) principles, while criteria for the environment are
designed to minimise the negative effects of agricultural production. While a mini-
mal level of occupational health and safety is part of GlobalGAP, this is not regu-
lated through in-depth audits of social conditions. Compliance with GlobalGAP is
assessed by use of control points, which are classiﬁed into three levels of impor-
tance: ‘major musts’, ‘minor musts’ and ‘recommendations’. Major musts are stan-
dards that have to be met with 100% compliance (GlobalGAP, 2004). All control
points that relate to food safety, and some points associated with occupational
safety, belong to this category. At present, over 250 control points have been identi-
ﬁed in GlobalGAP for fresh fruit and vegetables, of which over 50% deﬁne criteria
for the correct use of chemicals for pre- and postharvest treatment (GlobalGAP,
2004). To comply with these standards, producers generally have to change their
production technology, e.g. switch to less harmful pesticides and invest in structures
such as grading sheds, charcoal coolers, disposal pits, toilet and washing facilities,
and pesticide stores.
Some argue that such stringent food safety standards pose major challenges to
continued small-scale producers’ success in international markets for high-value
food products, such as fruit and vegetables (Augier et al., 2004). Yet others argue
that such standards can play a positive role, at least in some cases, providing the
catalyst and incentives for the modernisation of export supply and regulatory sys-
tems, for example through the adoption of safer and more sustainable production
and processing practices (Jaffee and Henson, 2004; Maertens and Swinnen, 2006).
Such standards also play a positive role in encouraging investment in new technolo-
gies. Although compliance with standards is associated with substantial costs, those
such as GlobalGAP also provide potential direct and indirect beneﬁts to the farm-
ers. Previous research has shown that adoption of standards can have a positive
effect on income (Asfaw et al., in press) although for smallholders it takes longer to
recover their investments (Mausch et al., 2008). In addition to the direct ﬁnancial
impact, one might consider the positive health and environmental impacts stemming
from changes in pesticide use and hygiene practices associated with adoption as
major non-ﬁnancial beneﬁts. This paper extends the existing analysis to capture pest
2 This study was conducted when EurepGAP, Version 2.1 (October 2004) was relevant. Since
then, EurepGAP has changed its name and logo to ‘GlobalGAP’, arguing that its proclaimed
role in promoting the harmonisation of good agricultural practices schemes had moved
beyond Europe. The name change was announced at the 8th EurepGAP Conference, the
EurepGAP Asia Conference, held in Bangkok on 6 and 7 September 2007. Therefore,
throughout this paper the term ‘GlobalGAP’ is used, and can be considered as synonymous
to ‘EurepGAP’.
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management and examines the impact of GlobalGAP3 standards on productivity
and changes in pesticide use.
Using farm-level data collected from a random cross-sectional sample of 539
Kenyan small-scale vegetable producers, this paper deals with the following ques-
tions: (i) How do smallholder export vegetable producers differ from domestic vege-
table producers in terms of pesticide use and total revenue? (ii) Does the adoption
of production standards affect the use of pesticides among export producers? and
(iii) Does the adoption of production standards affect the revenue of export produc-
ers? To answer these questions, an econometric model is applied, taking into
account potential problems of endogeneity and ⁄or selectivity with respect to pesti-
cide use, the choice of whether to produce for export and the adoption of stan-
dards.
In addressing these objectives, the contribution of this paper to the literature is
threefold. First, there is limited empirical evidence to test the hypothesis that food
safety standards confer a positive external effect on the farmers adopting it. While
some prior studies have analysed the income effect of standards, this study
investigates the link between adoption of food safety standards, pesticide use and
productivity. Second, in much of the previous literature on private standards,
self-selectivity (or endogeneity of adoption of standards) is ignored. The decision to
participate in the export market and, therefore, adopt the relevant food-safety stan-
dards is not a random event and depends on a number of observable and unobserv-
able factors. This paper addresses the issue using an extended three-stage damage
control production function framework. Third, this paper also draws upon a
relatively large sample dataset, which was collected via re-call and a season-long
monitoring survey.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the ana-
lytical model and the data. Section 3 presents the empirical results and in section 4
conclusions are drawn and some further implications are noted.
2. Data and Methods
2.1. Survey design and data
A multi-stage sampling procedure was used to select districts, sub-locations4 and
small-scale vegetable producers. In the ﬁrst stage, ﬁve districts were selected from
the two major vegetable-producing provinces (namely Nyeri, Kirinyaga and
Murang’a districts in Central Province, and Meru Central and Makueni districts in
Eastern Province) based on the intensity of export vegetable production, agro-ecol-
ogy, types of crop produced and accessibility. Meru district is located at a higher
altitude (above 2,300 m) primarily producing French beans, while Nyeri, Kirinyaga
and Murang’a districts are situated at a middle altitude (1,850–2,100 m), producing
3 Besides GlobalGAP there are other standards such as British Retail Consortium (BRC),
Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point (HACCP), Tesco’s Nature Choice (TNC) and ISO
9001:2000 that are relevant for the sector in Kenya. Nevertheless, these standards are more
stringent than GlobalGAP and are primarily adopted by large-scale producers. There was no
smallholder group certiﬁed under these other standards during our survey period and hence
our study mainly focuses on smallholders producing under GlobalGAP.
4 ‘Sub-location’ is the lowest administrative unit in Kenya and is composed of small villages.
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a range of green beans and peas. Makueni district is located at a lower altitude
(600–1,100 m), mainly producing Asian vegetables such as okra, chillies and auber-
gines. These districts represent the major export vegetable-producing areas, which
cover approximately half of all smallholder export vegetable producers in Kenya
(Mitho¨fer et al., 2008). As the number of export vegetable producers among the dis-
tricts varies, and to ensure that every element in the target population has an equal
chance of being included in the sample, we used the probability proportional to size
(PPS) sampling technique. Overall, 21 sub-locations were randomly selected from
the ﬁve districts by PPS sampling procedures and a total of 539 vegetable producer
households (both export and domestic market) were selected randomly for the inter-
views. Of these 149 are GlobalGAP adopter export farmers, 290 are non-adopter
export farmers and 100 are domestic vegetable producers. GlobalGAP adopters in
this case are deﬁned as small-scale export producers who have either already
obtained GlobalGAP certiﬁcation or are in the process of obtaining the certiﬁcate
under Option 2.5 Non-adopters are export farmers who are not involved in any way
in the process of GlobalGAP certiﬁcation.
Data collection took place during the 2005 ⁄2006 cropping season. For each ran-
domly selected farmer, the survey consisted of a single visit (re-call survey) and a
season-long monitoring of household production practices. The season-long moni-
toring data were collected for both dry (November 2005 to February 2006) and
rainy seasons (May to August 2006). However, many sampled farmers faced a total
crop failure resulting from drought during the dry season. It was very difﬁcult to
establish an input–output relationship when the yield harvested was zero for most
sampled farmers. Although the dry season information is scanty for econometric
modelling, it is sufﬁcient to further discuss results and implications for production
cost (pesticide use) and income streams throughout the year.
The data were collected by trained enumerators supervised by the ﬁrst author,
using structured questionnaires. The re-call survey questionnaire covered speciﬁc
information on the characteristics of household members, household income (both
farm and off-farm), household assets such as land and livestock ownership, farm
machinery and household equipment, as well as access to different services such
as credit, irrigation, formal contracts and group membership. The season-long
monitoring survey form was used to record inputs and outputs related to vegeta-
ble production. Besides personal interviews, a series of formal and informal
farmer group discussions was also conducted to complement the household sur-
vey. The data collected via group discussion include qualitative information on
the challenges of adopting GlobalGAP, contractual relationships between farmers
and exporters, problems associated with export production and marketing, etc.
This information is primarily used to explain the ﬁndings of the econometric
results.
5 GlobalGAP offers four types of certiﬁcation, although in Kenya at the time of the survey
only two of them were applied. Under Option 1 individual farmers apply for certiﬁcation
and under Option 2 a group of farmers applies for a group certiﬁcate. Farmers must invest
in the infrastructure necessary for GlobalGAP, establish an internal management and control
system, perform individual self-inspections and group internal inspections before receiving an
external veriﬁcation by a certiﬁcation body (GlobalGAP, 2004).
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2.2. Analytical model
Following the work of Lichtenberg and Zilberman (1986), Ajayi (2000), Huang
et al. (2002), Qaim (2003), Qaim and Zilbermann (2003), Pemsl (2006) and Shankar
and Thirtle (2005), this study takes the ‘damage control’ approach to establishing
pesticide productivity and computing economic optima for pesticide use. The Cobb
Douglas production function with logistic damage control function can be repre-
sented as:
lnðQÞ ¼ lnðaÞ þ
Xn
i¼1
bi lnðWiÞ þ cGi þ lnð1þ expðk aXpÞÞ1 þ v ð1Þ
where Q denotes total revenue per acre from vegetables,6 the vector Wi includes
labour, fertiliser, seed, number of vegetable crops grown, decision to produce for
export, price of vegetable output, type of vegetable produced, access to irrigation,
distance to market, quality of soil, age of the household head and Gi denotes adop-
tion of the GlobalGAP standard. A series of district dummy variables is also intro-
duced in the model to capture the heterogeneity in location-speciﬁc factors.7 The bi
values are the respective coefﬁcients to be estimated, k is constant, a is the para-
meter to be estimated for pesticide use and Xp in the logistic damage function
framework.
The effect of GlobalGAP adoption on revenue can be estimated correctly only if
the regression model is properly speciﬁed. It is obvious that the introduction of a
variable representing vegetable type in the model is crucial because price of output,
yield and cost of inputs can potentially be confounded with the type of vegetable
produced. However, as mentioned earlier, production of export vegetables among
smallholders is mostly district-speciﬁc, i.e. Meru farmers primarily produce French
beans, Makueni farmers produce Asian vegetables and farmers in the remaining dis-
tricts produce peas and French beans. The inclusion of a vegetable type variable
together with the district dummies can potentially create a multicollinearity prob-
lem. To check the robustness of the results to different speciﬁcations, we performed
a sensitivity analysis with and without a variable representing vegetable type.
Another long-standing problem with direct estimation of the production function
is that the inputs are treated as exogenous, whereas the farmers decide their levels.
Although this problem applies to all inputs, it is especially true of pesticides, as they
are often applied in response to pest pressure (Huang et al., 2002). Hence, it is pos-
sible that the covariance of xp and the residuals of the revenue function is non-zero,
indicating a systematic relationship among pests, pesticide use and vegetable yields;
a condition that would bias parameter estimates of the impact of pesticides on out-
put. Equation (1) also does not account for the possible selection bias of production
of export vegetables and the adoption of GlobalGAP in the production function
equation. The decision (a) to participate in the export market and (b) to adopt stan-
dards may be determined by unobservable variables that may also affect productiv-
ity. If this is the case, it leads to biased estimates of the impact of the adoption of
6 We used total revenue instead of total yield to capture the variation in the quality of the
produce and at the same time avoid the potential problem of aggregation error.
7 Average annual precipitation is not included in the model due to lack of data. The district
dummies included in the model partially capture the variation in rainfall.
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GlobalGAP. Table 1 gives an overview of the model speciﬁcation for revenue and
pesticide use function (without consideration of potential endogeneity problems)
and deﬁnition of variables included in the model.
A Wu–Hausman speciﬁcation test (Hausman, 1978) was performed to test the
null hypotheses that (a) pesticide use, GlobalGAP adoption and decision to produce
for export market are exogenous in the revenue function; and (b) GlobalGAP adop-
tion and decision to produce for export market are exogenous in pesticide use func-
tion, before further econometric analysis. The estimated Wu–Hausman chi-squared
statistics are reported in Table 2.
The P-values of the estimated F-test statistics show that the exogeneity hypothesis
is rejected in the revenue function for GlobalGAP adoption, pesticide use and deci-
sion to produce for the export market at the 5% and 15% level of signiﬁcance,
respectively. The exogeneity hypothesis for GlobalGAP adoption and decision to
produce for the export market in pesticide use function is rejected at the 5% and
15% level of signiﬁcance, respectively. The results of the Wu–Hausman speciﬁcation
test suggest that farmers’ decisions to produce for the export market, adopt Global-
GAP and pesticide input use are endogenous in the revenue production function
model and need to be accounted for to obtain efﬁcient and consistent estimates. It
is most likely that the destination markets and compliance with standards affect
product prices received as well as input costs incurred. If this is the case, prices are
not exogenous of the dependent variable revenues and costs. So it could be the case
that because of the speciﬁcation used, these equations will exhibit RHS endogeneity.
Yet endogeneity would remain a problem for the decision sequence in question with
a different speciﬁcation that did not conﬂate price with the dependent variable, i.e.
total yield and pesticide quantity as a dependent variable instead of total revenue
and pesticide cost.
To account empirically for this multiple endogeneity and ⁄or selectivity problem
in the production function, we use a model that consists of three stages (Rivers and
Vuong, 1988; Wooldridge, 2002; Arendt and Holm, 2006) as follows:
Stage 1: Adoption equation
Gi ¼ bZi þ ui ð2Þ
Stage 2: Reduced-form regression
Xp ¼ aVi þ cGi þ ei ð3Þ
Gi ¼ 1 if G

i >1
0 otherwise
n
ð4Þ
Stage 3: Structural equation
lnðQÞ ¼ bi lnðWiÞ þ cGi þ lnð1þ expðk aXpÞÞ1 þ vi ð5Þ
where Gi is the unobservable or latent variable for GlobalGAP adoption, Zi is a
non-stochastic vector of observed farm and non-farm characteristics determining
adoption (number of adult females, age of household head, educational attainment,
access to facilities, level of agricultural training, total hours spent listening to radio
per week, total hours spent watching television per week, use of mobile phone,
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Table 1
Model speciﬁcation and deﬁnition of variables
Model speciﬁcation without considering potential endogeneity problems
TRVG = f [SEED, FERT, LABO, PRES, CRNU, PEST, CRTY, ADOP, AGEH, PRPR,
MARK, FERL, IRRI, vegetable type dummies, district dummies]
PEST = f [CRTY, ADOP, PEPR, FEPR, PRES, HHSI, CONT, AGEH, DIST, GROU,
SYPT, FACI, TRAI, CRED, APPL, FERL, vegetable type dummies, district dummies]
Variable Deﬁnition
TRVG Total revenue of vegetables per acre per cropping season (KSh)
PEST Total cost of pesticide use per acre per cropping season (KSh)
AGEH Age of the household head (years)
HHSI Household size (adult equivalent)
SEED Seed cost per acre per cropping season (KSh)
FERT Fertiliser cost per acre per cropping season (KSh)
LABO Labour cost per acre per cropping season (KSh)
CRTY Choice to produce for export (1, if export market, 0 if domestic market)
CRNU Number of vegetable crops grown per cropping season
PRPR Average vegetable output price (KSh ⁄kg)
PRES Pressure of pest (scores from 1 to 9)
ADOP Adoption of GlobalGAP dummy
PEPR Price of pesticide (KSh ⁄ g)
FEPR Price of fertiliser (KSh ⁄kg)
SYPT Pesticide poisoning cases one year prior to the survey
FACI* Facility index
MOBI Number of years using mobile phone prior to the survey period
TRAI Number of major agricultural training subjects attended in the past three
years prior to 2005
GROU Number of years the household head has been a group member
CONT Number of years the household had a formal contract
DIST Distance to extension service (km)
CRED Amount of credit used for the past 3 years prior to 2005 (‘000 KSh)
OFFF Previous occupation was in non-agriculture dummy
EXPO Number of years the head has been producing for the export market prior
to survey period
APPL Primary applicator of pesticide (1, if household member, 0 if casual labour)
MARK Distance to nearest local market (km)
FERL Proportion of land that is fertile as percentage (%)
IRRI Access to irrigation dummy
Notes: *Facility index: Dh = RDih(1 ) Pi), Pi = ni ⁄ n where Dih = 1 if household h has
access to facility i; the facilities are having cemented ﬂoor, number of rooms, access to piped
water, and being less than 100 metres from water source; Pi is the probability of having facil-
ity i; ni = number of households which have a facility i; and n = total number of house-
holds (McCulloch and Ota, 2002).
Average product price is computed as the weighted mean price per kilogram of export vege-
tables (French beans, peas and Asian vegetables) and domestic vegetables (cabbage, tomatoes
and kales) separately for the sample households.
Pest pressure is measured on a scale from 1–9 where 1 represents a very low pest pressure
and 9 represents the very highest. It is evaluated subjectively by the farmers.
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contact to extension service, access to formal contract, duration of group member-
ship, years of export production, use of irrigation and participation in off-farm
activities), Xp denotes the pesticide use (includes insecticide, herbicide and fungi-
cide), Vi is a vector of exogenous variables thought to affect pesticide use (age of
household, household size, pest pressure, price of pesticide, price of fertiliser, level
of agricultural training, access to extension service, access to credit service), Gi is
the predicted value of GlobalGAP adoption from stage 1, Qi denotes total revenue
per acre from export vegetables, Wi represents covariates expected to inﬂuence the
structural revenue equation, Xp denotes the predicted value of pesticide use from
stage 2, and ui, ei and vi are random disturbances associated with the adoption of
GlobalGAP, pesticide use and the revenue model, respectively.
The purpose of stages 1 and 2 is to eliminate the problem of endogeneity of
GlobalGAP adoption and pesticide use in the structural model. To solve this prob-
lem, the endogenous variable is ﬁrst regressed on the instruments and then the esti-
mated value of the endogenous variable is included in the structural equation
instead of the endogenous variable itself (Greene, 1997; Wooldridge, 2002). So in
stage 1, we estimate the probability of adopting GlobalGAP as a function of a
number of variables that explain the adoption decision using probit estimation.
From this model, we construct an estimate of predicted value of GlobalGAP adop-
tion, which is then included in stages 2 and 3 of our model. In stage 2 of our
model, pesticide use is estimated based on the reduced-form equation, which con-
tains the instruments, the predicted value of GlobalGAP adoption from stage 1,
and a number of control variables. In stage 3 the structural equation incorporating
the logistic damage control function is then estimated. In this stage, the dependent
variable of interest, here the total revenue per acre from vegetable production, is
regressed on the estimated values of the endogenous variables from stages 1 and 2.
In doing so, we control for the endogeneity problem of both variables at the same
time in our structural model and estimate the impact of GlobalGAP adoption, as
well as pesticide use, on revenue.
For the ﬁrst stage, our identiﬁcation strategy is based on variations in the stock
of social capital enjoyed by different households. Our hypothesis is that the
Table 2
Results of Wu–Hausman speciﬁcation tests
Null hypothesis
Wu–Hausman
F-test statistics P-value
Exogeneity of GlobalGAP adoption discrete choice
in revenue function
3.78 0.053*
Exogeneity of pesticide inputs use in revenue function 1.55 0.138
Exogeneity of choice to produce for export market
in revenue function
1.48 0.145
Exogeneity of GlobalGAP adoption discrete choice
in pesticide use function
4.15 0.043**
Exogeneity of choice to produce for export market
in pesticide use function
1.60 0.114
Notes: Statistical signiﬁcance at the 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**), 0.1 (*) and 0.15 () level of
probability.
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probability of a household adopting GlobalGAP is an increasing function of its
‘stock of social capital’ within the rural community, reﬂected by three instrumen-
tal variables: the number of years a household has been producing for the export
market; duration of group membership; the number of years the household has
been using a mobile phone. These variables do not have any direct effect on pesti-
cide use and revenue, though they are hypothesised to affect the probability that
the household adopts GlobalGAP standards. For the second stage pesticide use
function, based on existing literature (Pemsl, 2006), two instruments are chosen:
price of pesticide and price of fertiliser. These instruments are highly correlated
with pesticide use but do not have any effect on revenue except through the yield
effect of pesticide use.
To examine the impact of the participation of smallholders in export vs. domestic
market channels on pesticide use and total revenue, we apply the same procedure.
At the ﬁrst stage we estimated the determinants of participation in the export mar-
ket using the total sample (which includes both domestic and export farmers) to
obtain the predicted value of participation. Then we include this variable in the sec-
ond (pesticide use) function as discussed above. In the third stage the revenue func-
tion is estimated by including the predicted value of the decision to produce for the
export market, which is obtained from the ﬁrst stage, and predicted value of pesti-
cide use that is estimated from the second stage pesticide use function. Hence, the
pesticide use function and the revenue function are estimated for each stratum, i.e.
a total sample that encompasses domestic and export farmers, and a sub-sample
that includes only export farmers.
The decision to participate in export is instrumented by a dummy for whether
the previous occupation was in non-agriculture. This variable is correlated with
participation status but would it be uncorrelated with pesticide use and revenue?
If those with more managerial ability choose non-agricultural occupations, then a
previous occupation dummy is likely to be correlated with export participation
ability. However, such an argument supposes that those with initial careers in
non-agriculture had the choice of pursuing a career in export production. This is
unlikely to be generally true because family background (especially father’s occu-
pation in the Kenyan context) and information (technical and business expertise
in export production) are important determinants of the set of initial job alterna-
tives that an individual would consider. Furthermore, there is no compelling rea-
son for management ability to be correlated with the previous occupation dummy.
For the second stage, pesticide use is instrumented by price of pesticide and fertil-
iser. The validity of our results depends to a large extent on the quality of these
instruments. We assess the quality of our instrument by using an F-test of the
joint signiﬁcance of the excluded instruments. According to Stock and Staiger
(1997), the weak instrument hypothesis will be rejected if the F-test statistic is
greater than 10. Additionally as part of robustness check, we also perform over-
identiﬁcation tests of the model.
3. Results and Discussion
3.1. Descriptive analysis
The most frequently grown export vegetable is French beans, whereas the most pre-
valent crops for the domestic market are cabbage, tomatoes and kales. As shown in
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Table 3, of the total sample households in the ﬁve districts, 55.3% grow French
beans on an average plot size of 0.35 acres per household. Peas and Asian vegeta-
bles are grown by 23.9% and 7.4% of the sample households, on an average plot
size of 0.28 for peas and 0.38 acres for Asian vegetables, respectively. Among vege-
tables produced for the domestic market, cabbage is produced by about 14.3% of
the sampled households, while kale and tomatoes are produced by 8.7% and 5.6%
of the sample, respectively. Table 3 gives the number of growers, area allocated to
each type of vegetable crop per household, total yield per acre and the average price
received per kilogram of output.
Table 4 presents the t-test comparison of mean values of selected production vari-
ables between export and domestic vegetable producers and GlobalGAP adopter
categories. The total yield is signiﬁcantly higher for domestic vegetable producers.
However, total revenue and net revenue8 per acre for export vegetable producers
are not signiﬁcantly higher than those of domestic producers in contrast to the ﬁnd-
ings of McCulloch and Ota (2002). Our results only capture revenue and net reve-
nue in the rainy season, and if year-round production is considered, export farmers
are likely to have higher incomes compared with those who produce for the domes-
tic market. With the exception of labour cost and land use, export and domestic
vegetable producers are distinguishable by other input costs such as fertiliser, seeds
and pesticides. The cost of fertiliser is signiﬁcantly higher for export vegetable pro-
ducers, but the cost of seeds is lower compared with their domestic counterparts. It
is also clear from the descriptive statistics that domestic vegetable producers use less
pesticide and spend less money on them than do export vegetable producers. The
results also show that domestic-oriented farmers use less herbicide than export-
oriented farmers, but both use similar amounts of insecticide. For example, farm-
ers producing for the domestic market applied 0.87 kg of pesticides per acre on
Table 3
Number of growers, farm size, yield and price (N = 539)
Vegetable types* Count Per cent
Farm size
(acres)
Yield
(kg ⁄ acre)
Price
(KSh ⁄kg)
French beans 298 55.3 0.35 1,732 33
Peas 129 23.9 0.28 2,240 42
Asian vegetables 40 7.4 0.38 1,416 25
Cabbage 77 14.3 0.29 2,960 14
Kale 47 8.7 0.22 3,968 12
Tomatoes 31 5.6 0.25 2,232 18
Notes: *Vegetables produced solely for home consumption are not considered. The list
includes only vegetables produced for commercial purposes, either for the domestic or export
market.
Asian vegetable category includes okra, chillies, karalla and aubergines.
The exchange rate at the time of the survey was approximately 72 KSh ⁄ $US.
8 Net revenue is computed as total revenue from vegetables minus all variable costs, includ-
ing family labour per cropping season. The value of family labour was approximated by the
existing wage rate in the nearest village.
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average, whereas export vegetable farmers used 1.10 kg per acre. The lower pesti-
cide quantities also translate into cost savings for farmers. Domestic vegetable pro-
ducers spent 1,093 KSh per acre9 on pesticides; on average, export farmers spent
1,730 KSh per acre.
GlobalGAP adopters and non-adopters only differ signiﬁcantly with respect to
seed cost and number of crops grown per cropping season. GlobalGAP adopters
incur signiﬁcantly higher seed costs, which might be partially attributed to the
high prices for the better quality seed that is demanded by exporters who pursue
GlobalGAP standards. We observe that the groups are indistinguishable with
respect to total quantity of pesticide used per acre although the associated costs are
signiﬁcantly higher for non-adopters. Besides, if we compare the types of pesticides
used among the categories, non-adopters use signiﬁcantly higher amounts of Hazard
Category II and III pesticides, which WHO classiﬁes as highly toxic and toxic,
respectively, whereas the adopters use higher amounts of Hazard Category IV,
which WHO classiﬁes as moderately toxic. The results also reveal that the adopters
use signiﬁcantly higher amounts of herbicide per acre than the non-adopters even
though the extra herbicide quantity does not translate into higher cost. Total
yield, total revenue and the net-revenue per acre are all signiﬁcantly higher for
GlobalGAP adopters compared with the non-adopters.
3.2. Stage 2: pesticide use model results
As shown in Table 5 the results of both pesticide use functions demonstrate that
the model performed well in explaining pesticide use, with reasonable explanatory
power for cross-sectional data (adjusted R-square values between 0.25 and 0.34).
Over-identiﬁcation tests support the choice of the instruments, as do the F-test val-
ues for the ﬁrst-stage export crop participation. The F-statistic of joint signiﬁcance
of the excluded instruments is greater than 10, thus passing the test for weak instru-
ments. The null hypothesis in the over-identiﬁcation test is that the instruments are
valid. The over-identiﬁcation tests for the ﬁrst-stage adoption model however did
not support the validity of duration of group membership which was therefore
dropped as an instrument. The test does not reject the validity of years of produc-
tion for export market and use of mobile phones, and hence they were used as
instruments.
Most importantly, the regression model results demonstrate the impact of the
decision to produce for export market (CRTY) and adoption of GlobalGAP stan-
dards (ADOP) on expenditure on pesticides.10 The positive and highly signiﬁcant
coefﬁcient on the CRTY variable means that export vegetable producers spend
9 Kenyan Shilling (KSh) is the currency of Kenya. The exchange rate at the time of the sur-
vey was approximately 72 KSh ⁄ $US1.
10 The estimation results of a standard ordinary least square (OLS) of pesticide use function
are presented in Table 7. The OLS estimates for participation in export market are smaller
and insigniﬁcant than the instrument variable (IV) estimates in pesticide use function. The
OLS estimates underestimate the use of pesticide. The IV and OLS estimates for adoption of
GlobalGAP standards also show a difference both in terms of signiﬁcance and magnitude.
The OLS overestimate the reduction in pesticide use. Overall, comparison of the IV with the
OLS estimates shows that correction for unobservables is important.
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more on pesticides than do domestic vegetable producers. Ceteris paribus, farmers
producing export crops spend 28% more on pesticides than farmers producing
domestic crops.11 However, with regard to the pesticide use function estimated for
export farmers, we observe no signiﬁcant difference between the adopter categories
in terms of cost of pesticide use. This indicates that GlobalGAP adoption does
not signiﬁcantly reduce the pesticide expenditures of smallholder export producers.12
Furthermore, there seems, on casual inspection, to be no signiﬁcant difference in
the drivers of pesticide use between the exporters and the total sample, with the
possible exception of the MURANGA dummy, though the total sample is domi-
nated by the exporters. This might be attributed to three factors. First, exporters
who monitor and enforce compliance with GlobalGAP have higher grading stan-
dards and thus place more emphasis on physical appearance of the produce (e.g.
spotlessness), which implicitly encourages chemical control of pests and diseases.
Second, although GlobalGAP requirements advocate the use of alternative pest
control strategies such as integrated pest management (IPM), export farmers rarely
resort to this alternative because of the risks associated with the possible outbreak
and rapid spread of pests, an outcome that is exacerbated by the tropical climate.
Third, export companies that enforce GlobalGAP also indirectly promote the use
of chemical control by handing farmers a weekly spray programme and sometimes
undertake direct spraying by their technical personnel. These chemicals are often
relatively new and selective, and thus expensive and less hazardous, compared with
the traditional chemicals available in the market. To examine whether adoption of
standards affects the types of pesticide used, we further estimated an alternative
function by using the ratio of WHO Hazard Category I and II pesticides to the
total pesticides as a dependent variable. The estimation results13 demonstrate that
the adopter categories are distinguishable in types of pesticide used; i.e. non-adopt-
ers use signiﬁcantly greater amounts of WHO Hazard Category I and II pesticides
compared with non-adopters. These ﬁndings correspond with the descriptive results
presented earlier.
The coefﬁcient of the variable FEPR is negative and statistically signiﬁcant for
both pesticide use functions, whereas the price of pesticide (PEPR) is positively
associated. This suggests that the expenditure on pesticide use is inversely related to
the price of fertiliser and directly related to pesticide price, which is in line with
expectations. Though not necessarily, this might also suggest that demand for pesti-
cides is price inelastic, since otherwise pesticide price increases would result in
reduced expenditure. On the other hand, farmers having access to credit services
(CRED) spend signiﬁcantly more on pesticides, suggesting that ﬁnancial constraints
may be one impediment to pesticide use among export farmers. As expected, the
11 When dummy variables are used in a model with a log-transformed dependent variable,
the coefﬁcient of the dummy variable multiplied by 100 is not the usual percentage effect of
that variable on the dependent variable (Kennedy, 1981). Instead it should be calculated as:
h ¼ 100  expðbi  1=2vðbiÞÞ  1½  where h is the percentage change in the level of the depen-
dent variable, bi is the estimated coefﬁcient of the dummy variable and v(bi) is the estimated
variance of bi, which is applied in this study.
12 We also estimated an alternative function using quantity of pesticide used as a dependent
variable and found no signiﬁcant difference between adopter categories.
13 The estimation results are available on request from the authors.
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coefﬁcient of pest pressure (PRES) is positive, although it is not signiﬁcant for the
pesticide use function for export farmers. While the prevalence of pests might be
expected to increase pesticide use, this suggests that exporters use pesticides as
preventatives rather than in response to speciﬁc attacks.
Table 5
Results of pesticide use function estimation
Variable
Amount of pesticide use: ln-total cost (KSh ⁄ acre)
Domestic and export vegetable
producers
Export vegetable producers
only
Estimated
coefﬁcient
Standard
error t-value
Estimated
coefﬁcient
Standard
error t-value
Constant 6.83*** 0.49 14.01 7.63*** 0.53 14.52
ADOP estimated )0.05 0.16 )0.32
CRTY estimated 0.31** 0.14 2.27
PEPR 0.15*** 0.04 3.97 0.13*** 0.04 3.57
FEPR )0.03*** 0.01 )3.37 )0.03*** 0.01 )3.76
AGEH )0.01 0.01 )1.02 )0.01* 0.01 )1.74
HHSI )0.04* 0.03 )1.51 )0.04* 0.03 )1.61
PRES 0.06* 0.03 1.86 0.05 0.04 1.42
CONT 0.03 0.03 0.93 0.05 0.03 1.50
GROU 0.18 0.03 0.61 0.04 0.03 1.48
SYPT 0.60 0.04 1.56 0.05 0.04 1.17
FACI )0.12 0.10 )1.23 )0.24** 0.11 )2.27
TRAI )0.03* 0.02 )1.71 )0.03 0.02 )1.32
DIST 0.09*** 0.02 3.93 0.07*** 0.02 3.11
CRED 0.00* 0.00 1.81 0.00* 0.00 1.68
APPL 0.36** 0.16 2.14 0.38** 0.18 2.12
FERL )0.01 0.02 0.67 0.03 0.02 1.11
DISTRICTS
MERU (reference)
KIRINYAGA )0.23 0.21 )1.09 )0.23 0.25 )0.91
MURANGA 0.09 0.32 0.28 0.85** 0.40 2.12
NYERI )0.01 0.20 )0.08 0.16 0.23 0.68
MAKUENI )0.94*** 0.31 )3.07 )1.01** 0.40 )2.50
Number of observations 539 439
R-square 0.28 0.38
Adj. R-square 0.25 0.34
Test of instruments
F-test (ﬁrst stage) 11.49 9.61
P-value 0.00 0.00
Test of over-identiﬁcation
Chi-square 0.18 0.29
P-value 0.67 0.49
Notes: Statistical signiﬁcance at the 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**) and 0.1 (*) level of probability.
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The parameter estimate for the level of training (TRAI) is negative and signiﬁ-
cant for the pesticide use function, pointing to a positive effect of agricultural
training on reduction of pesticide use. As expected, the coefﬁcient of distance to
extension service (DIST), which is used as a proxy for access to information and
advice, is positively and signiﬁcantly associated with the expenditure on chemical
pesticide, suggesting that farmers with more access to information and consul-
tancy tend to reduce spending on pesticides. Household size (HHSI) in both
functions is negatively correlated with pesticide use. This may suggest that the
more members the household has the more labour is available for activities like
weeding, which leads to reduction in herbicide usage. Age of the household head
also seems to play a role in how much farmers spend on pesticides, i.e. younger
vegetable farmers spend less than older farmers. The most interesting result is
the coefﬁcient that captures pesticide application (APPL). It was expected that
the more a household head relied on hired casual labour to spray chemicals, the
more pesticide would be used because of the shift of risk associated with pesti-
cide spraying to another party. However, our results show a positive and signiﬁ-
cant correlation between the household head as primary applicator of pesticide
and the spending on pesticides. Possibly, farmers who do the spraying themselves
are able to use the money that would otherwise be spent on labour hire to buy
more chemical pesticides.
3.3. Stage 3: structural revenue model results
The estimated revenue functions are aimed at investigating potential differences in
the productivity of pesticides and total revenue among farmers producing for the
domestic market vs. those producing for export market, and GlobalGAP adopters
vs. non-adopters. The results for both samples are shown in Table 6. The models
have a satisfactory explanatory power with adjusted R-square ranging from 0.3
to 0.4, which is reasonable for a cross-sectional dataset. The F-statistic of the
excluded instruments is greater than 10 for both second-stage models, thus passing
the test for weak instruments. The two instruments work well according to the Han-
sen speciﬁcation test of overidentifying restrictions.
The results of the revenue function estimated for all vegetable producers indicate
that although there is a positive correlation between the decision to produce for
export market (CRTY) and value of the crop yield, the coefﬁcient is not signiﬁcant.
This result implies that export farmers and domestic farmers are indistinguishable
in terms of revenue per acre earned during the long rainy season (Table 6). How-
ever, it would be expected that the revenue for export producers is higher if the dry
season were to be included, for three basic reasons. First, the volume of sales for
export producers is higher because of year-round production, unlike most domestic
farms, which are seasonal. Second, the price of the export produce is relatively
higher during the dry season because of high demand in most European countries,
which could lead to higher returns. Third, exporter-oriented farmers have year-
round access to markets, whereas domestic producers have a narrower marketing
window.
The coefﬁcient of GlobalGAP adoption (ADOP) is positive and signiﬁcant in the
revenue function estimated for export farmers, which indicates the positive impact
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of GlobalGAP adoption on total revenue per acre. Ceteris paribus, GlobalGAP
adopters get 24% higher crop revenue than non-adopters.14
The results show that for both revenue functions, the expenditure on seed, pesti-
cide and labour are the most important determinants of the ﬁnal output obtained in
vegetable ﬁelds. All these variables have the expected sign. Fertiliser is not signiﬁcant
in either sample. The coefﬁcient of pesticide (PEST) shows that a 1% increase in pes-
ticide expenditure in vegetable ﬁelds causes partial effectiveness of damage control
input to increase by 0.002% for the ﬁrst model and 0.003% for the second. As
expected, product price (PRPR) has a positive impact on total revenue for both
functions. The effects of seed (SEED) and labour (LABO) are positive and signiﬁ-
cant in both models. The expenditure on seed reﬂects both variety speciﬁcs such as
the potential yield for a variety, and is a quality indicator, for instance in terms of
germination rate. Theoretically, it could be expected that farm output would increase
signiﬁcantly with an increase in a farmer’s management ability (measured in terms of
the farmer’s age). However, farmer’s age (AGEH) is negatively associated with reve-
nues here, albeit insigniﬁcantly for the exporters. Perhaps young farmers are more
receptive to new varieties and management techniques and likely to face the risks
associated with innovations that could lead to higher outputs. Two of the four dis-
trict dummy coefﬁcients (KIRINYAGA and MURANGA) have a negative sign,
whereas the coefﬁcient of one district (MAKUENI) has a positive sign. These indi-
cate that farmers in the Meru district (reference district) have signiﬁcantly more reve-
nue from vegetable production compared with those in Kirinyaga and Muranga
districts, but less compared with farmers in Makueni districts. Meru district is
located at a higher altitude, which has favourable climatic condition for vegetable
production. This results in high productivity, high quality and high prices for the
produce. On the other hand, farmers in Makueni district have the advantage of using
irrigation water. Farmers producing vegetables for the domestic market in Makueni
district also have the advantage of delivering their produce to either Nairobi or
Mombassa market, which could boost the price they receive, compared with farmers
in other districts.15
Using the estimated coefﬁcients presented in Table 6, the associated marginal
value products (MVPs), and the actual and optimal amount of pesticides for Global-
GAP adopters, non-adopters and domestic farmers are computed and presented in
Table 7. These computations are based on the assumption of all other inputs being
14 Standard OLS estimation results of revenue function are presented in Appendix 1. The
OLS estimates for participation in export market are larger and statistically more signiﬁcant
than the instrument variable estimates in the revenue function. Comparison with the OLS
estimates shows that correction for unobservables is essential. The OLS estimates overesti-
mate the revenue gain from participation in the export market because of the unobserved fac-
tors that matter for selection as export producers positively impact revenue from exporting.
The IV and OLS estimates for adoption of GlobalGAP standards also show a difference
both in terms of signiﬁcance and magnitude. The OLS overestimate the income gain from
adopting GlobalGAP standards.
15 In an alternative model speciﬁcation, which includes a set of dummies for types of vegeta-
bles produced instead of district dummies, we observed no signiﬁcant change in the sign and
level of signiﬁcance of our interest variables although the signiﬁcance level is changed by a
small percentage for two variables (LABO and AGEH). The full results of this speciﬁcation
are available on request from the author.
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constant at the sample average values, while only varying the pesticide cost. For the
logistic damage function speciﬁcation, the derivation of the marginal value products
of pesticide (Xp) is obtained as follows:
@Q
@Xp
¼ Q
1 exp ðk a1XpÞ  a1 exp ðl a1XpÞ: ð6Þ
The results demonstrate that the marginal value products per unit cost of pesti-
cide are greater than unity for all cases, suggesting that all farmers (GlobalGAP
Table 6
Estimates of the revenue function
Variable
Revenue function: ln-total revenue (KSh ⁄ acre)
Domestic and export vegetable
producers
Export vegetable producers
only
Estimated
coefﬁcient
Standard
error t-value
Estimated
coefﬁcient
Standard
error t-value
Constant 8.19*** 0.83 9.87 5.60*** 1.05 5.32
CRTY estimated 0.38 0.10 0.94
ADOP estimated 0.27** 0.12 2.30
SEED 0.14*** 0.04 3.54 0.22*** 0.06 3.54
FERT 0.03 0.04 0.88 0.07 0.07 1.02
LABO 0.29*** 0.06 4.50 0.37*** 0.08 4.49
AGEH )0.38** 0.16 )2.35 )0.28 0.20 )1.40
CRNU 0.09 0.12 0.77 0.23* 0.15 1.64
PRPR 0.23*** 0.07 2.89 0.20*** 0.05 2.45
IRRI 0.05 0.03 0.54 0.40 0.03 0.42
MARK )0.14 0.10 1.32 )0.13 0.08 1.45
FERL 0.02 0.01 0.87 0.03 0.02 0.61
DISTRICTS
MERU (reference)
KIRINYAGA )0.53*** 0.13 )4.26 )0.50*** 0.15 )3.27
MURANGA )0.71*** 0.18 )3.89 )0.42* 0.25 )1.70
NYERI 0.09 0.14 0.66 )0.01 0.17 )0.04
MAKUENI 0.48** 0.22 2.17 0.65* 0.12 2.30
Damage control function
Constant (k) 0.69*** 0.26 2.66 0.68* 0.39 1.73
PEST estimated 0.00*** 0.00 3.29 0.00** 0.00 2.46
Number of observations 539 439
R-square 0.37 0.34
Adjusted R-square 0.35 0.31
Test of instruments
F-test (second stage) 10.34 11.19
P-value 0.00 0.00
Test of over-identiﬁcation
Chi-square 0.77 0.77
P-value 0.38 0.38
Notes: Statistical signiﬁcance at the 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**) and 0.1 (*) level of probability.
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adopters, non-adopters and domestic vegetable producers) use pesticides below the
ﬁnancial optimum. Results of the t-tests compared with the null hypothesis that
MVP = 1 are all statistically signiﬁcant below 10% signiﬁcance level (see Table 7).16
Domestic producers in particular are using pesticides at far below their optimal
levels. For example, GlobalGAP adopters spend 630 KSh ⁄acre below the optimal
level on pesticides; non-adopters use nearly 185 KSh ⁄acre less and domestic farmers
spend almost 1,485 KSh ⁄acre less than optimal. Pesticide use below the ﬁnancial
optimum level has been reported for conventional cotton in West Africa (Ajayi,
2000) and Bacillus thuringiensis (BT) cotton in South Africa (Shankar and Thirtle,
2005). This underuse may have several causes, including ﬁnancial constraints and
the perceived risk of detectable pesticide residues leading to product rejection by
exporters.
It is important to note however that the calculated optimal pesticide use levels do
not take into account any environmental or health costs of pesticide use. If we
assume a ratio of 1 : 1 for health costs alone (see Rola and Pingali, 1994), underuse
of pesticide may no longer exist.
4. Conclusions
This study contributes to the growing literature on the implications of introducing
food-safety standards in developing countries for farmers’ production systems, using
the case of Kenyan vegetable producers. Results show that farmers producing vege-
tables for the domestic market use signiﬁcantly less pesticides than exporting farm-
ers. Ceteris paribus, farmers producing for the export market spend 28% more on
pesticides than farmers producing domestic crops. This study also showed that the
Table 7
Estimated marginal value product of chemical pesticides (in KSh)
Variables
Export market producers (N = 439) Domestic
market
producers
(N = 100)
GlobalGAP
adopters
Non-
adopters Total
Marginal value
products (KSh)
5.61 (2.43***) 1.64 (1.96*) 5.84 (2.64***) 21.04 (3.77***)
Actual pesticide
use (KSh ⁄ acre)
1503 1860 1730 1093
Optimal pesticide
use (KSh ⁄ acre)
2135 2045 2595 2575
Notes: Number in brackets shows a t-test compared to null hypothesis that MVP = 1.
Statistical signiﬁcance at the 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**) and 0.1 (*) level of probability.
16 MVP analysis might have shortcomings when applied to pesticide use in general because a
marginal decision rule is predicated upon the assumption of a divisible input. Pesticide labels
clearly state that they are to be treated like medicines and applied at standard rates for rea-
sons of safety and efﬁcacy. However, for most developing countries, this may not be the case
because farmers’ decision rule is determined by a number of constraints such as liquidity.
Thus we believe that MVP analysis is informative on the decision of pesticide use.
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adoption of standards by the export farmers does not have any signiﬁcant impact
on the total expenditures on pesticides. In export vegetables, both adopters and
non-adopters of standards still use pesticides at below the private economic
optimum rate, though may be closer to optimal if the health and environmental
side-effects of pesticide use are also considered. The adopter categories are distin-
guishable in terms of types of pesticide used, i.e. adopters use safer pesticides based
on WHO classiﬁcation, which support the hypothesis of standards contributing to
modernisation of the export sector. The three-stage structural revenue model results
demonstrate a positive and signiﬁcant impact of standards adoption on revenue
from vegetable production. The results also show that export and domestic farmers
are indistinguishable in terms of total revenue earned per acre from producing
vegetables, at least during the long rainy season.
While food safety and quality standards can be barriers preventing resource-poor
smallholders from maintaining their position in the lucrative export markets (Asfaw
et al., in press), they can also induce positive changes in the production systems of
small-scale farmers who adopt it, as shown by the results presented. A shift to less
hazardous pesticides as a result of GlobalGAP adoption can imply less pesticide
intoxication by farmers and farm workers, less adverse impact on the environment
and enhanced food safety.
Generally, the empirical results presented in this paper support the notion that
the adoption of emerging food-safety standards can play a positive role by serv-
ing as a catalyst for transforming production systems towards safer and more
sustainable operation. Hence, these standards can have health and environmental
beneﬁts aside from those that accrue for consumers in industrialised countries.
Nevertheless, in order to extrapolate these results to the whole vegetable
sector in Kenya, it is crucial to look closely at the scale of adoption of
standards nationwide. According to data from FoodPlus secretariat, the legal
body of GlobalGAP, and a separate survey by Mitho¨fer et al. (2008), the scale
of adoption among export vegetable producers seems to be rather low (i.e. below
20%) for achieving a direct signiﬁcant impact within the smallholder vegetable
export sector. Our data suggest that about 33% of the sampled households
adopted the standards during the survey season though this may not necessarily
reﬂect the rate of adoption.
In previous farm-level analysis of determinants of GlobalGAP adoption in Kenya
(Asfaw et al., in press), we identiﬁed lack of human capital (e.g. level of education
of household members), physical capital (e.g. farm machinery) and social capital
(e.g. group membership) as major determining factors that limit the adoption of
standards by smallholders. The government and the private sector can help farmers
to expand and upgrade their range of assets and practices to meet the new require-
ments of supermarkets and other coordinated supply chains. The options include
public investment in increasing farmers’ productivity and connectivity to markets,
and promotion of collective action and the building of the technical capacity of
farmers to meet the new standards.
References
Ajayi, O. O. C. Pesticide Use Practices, Productivity and Farmers’ Health: The Case of Cot-
ton–Rice Systems in Coˆte d’Ivoire, West Africa, Pesticide Policy Project No. 3 (Hannover:
University of Hannover, 2000).
664 Solomon Asfaw, Dagmar Mitho¨fer and Hermann Waibel
 2009 The Authors. Journal compilation  2009 The Agricultural Economics Society.
Antle, J. M. and Capalbo, S. M. ‘Pesticides, productivity and farmer health: Implications for
regulatory policy and agricultural research’, American Journal of Agricultural Economics,
Vol. 76, (1994) pp. 598–602.
Antle, J. M. and Pingali, P. L. ‘Pesticide, productivity and farmer health: A Philippine case
study’, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 76, (1994) pp. 418–430.
Arendt, J. N. and Holm, A. Probit Models with Binary Endogenous Regressors, Discussion
Paper No. 4 (Department of Business and Economics, University of Southern Denmark,
2006).
Asfaw, S., Mitho¨fer, D. and Waibel, H. ‘What impact are EU supermarket standards having
on developing countries export of high-value horticultural products? Evidence from
Kenya’, International Journal of Food and Agribusiness Marketing, in press.
Augier, P., Gasiorek, M. and Lai Tong, C. ‘The impact of rules of origin on trade ﬂows’,
Economic Policy, Vol. 20, (2004) pp. 567–623.
Dolan, C. ‘The ‘good wife’: Struggles over resources in the Kenyan horticultural sector’,
Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 37, (2001) pp. 39–70.
GlobalGAP, GlobalGAP Protocol for Fresh Fruit and Vegetables (Cologne: GlobalGAP
Secretariat, 2004; available at: http://www.globalgap.org; last accessed: April 2008).
Government of Kenya (GoK), Central Bureau of Statistics. 2006 Statistical Abstract
(Nairobi: The Government Printer, 2006).
Greene, W. H. Econometric Analysis, 3rd edn (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall,
1997).
Hausman, J. A. ‘Speciﬁcation tests in econometrics’, Econometrica, Vol. 46, (1978)
pp. 1251–1272.
Huang, J., Hu, R., Roelle, S., Qiao, F. and Pray, C. E. ‘Transgenic variety and productivity
of smallholder cotton farmers in China’, Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource
Economics, Vol. 46, (2002) pp. 367–387.
Jaffee, S., van der Meer, K., Henson, S., de Haan, C., Sewadeh, M., Ignacio, L., Lamb, J.
and Lisazo, M. B. Food-Safety and Agricultural Health Standards: Challenges and Opportu-
nities for Developing Countries Export (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2005).
Kennedy, P. E. ‘Estimation with correctly interpreted dummy variables in semilogarithmic
equations’, American Economic Review, Vol. 71, (1981) pp. 801.
Lichtenberg, E. and Zilberman, D. ‘The econometrics of damage control: Why speciﬁcation
matters’, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 68, (1986) pp. 261–273.
Maertens, M. and Swinnen, J. F. M. ‘Standards as barriers and catalysts for trade and pov-
erty reduction’ (Paper presented at the 26th Conference of IAEA, Gold Coast, Australia,
12–18 August 2006).
Mausch, K., Mitho¨fer, D., Asfaw, S. and Waibel, H. ‘Impact of EurepGAP standard in
Kenya: Comparing smallholders to large-scale vegetable producers’ (Paper presented at
Tropentag, International agricultural research for development, Bonn, Germany 11–13
October 2006).
McCulloch, N. and Ota, D. M. Export Horticulture and Poverty in Kenya, Working Paper
174 (Brighton: Institute of Development Studies, 2002).
Mitho¨fer, D., Nang’ole, E. and Asfaw, S. ‘Smallholder access to the export market: The case
of vegetables in Kenya’, Outlook on Agriculture, Vol. 37 (2008) pp. 203–211.
Pemsl, D. ‘Economics of agricultural biotechnology in crop protection in developing coun-
tries: The case of Bt-cotton in Shandong province, China’, Ph.D. Dissertation (Hannover:
University of Hannover, 2006).
Pimentel, D. and Greiner, A. ‘Environmental and socio-economic costs of pesticide use’
in D. Pimentel (eds.), Techniques for Reducing Pesticide Use: Economic and Environmental
Beneﬁts (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1997).
Pingali, P. L., Marquez, C. B. and Palis, F. G. ‘Pesticide and Philippine rice farmer health: A
medical and economic analysis’, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 76,
(1994) pp. 587–592.
665EU Food Safety Standards, Pesticide Use and Farm-level Productivity
 2009 The Authors. Journal compilation  2009 The Agricultural Economics Society.
Qaim, M. ‘Bt cotton in India: Field trial results and economic projections’, World Develop-
ment, Vol. 31, (2003) pp. 2115–2127.
Qaim, M. and Zilbermann, D. ‘Yield effects of genetically modiﬁed crops in developing
countries’, Science, Vol. 299, (2003) pp. 900–902.
Rivers, D. and Vuong, Q. H. ‘Limited information estimators and exogeneity tests for simul-
taneous probit models’, Journal of Econometrics, Vol. 39, (1988) pp. 347–366.
Rola, A. C. and Pingali, P. L. Pesticides, Rice Productivity and Farmers’ Health – An Eco-
nomic Assessment (Manila: IRRI, International Rice Research Institute, 1993).
Shankar, B. and Thirtle, C. ‘Pesticide productivity and transgenic cotton technology: The
South African smallholder case’, Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 56, (2005) pp. 97–
116.
Stock, J. and Staiger, D. ‘‘Instrumental variables regression with weak instruments’’,
Econometrica, Vol. 65, (1997) pp. 557–586.
Thrupp, L. A., Bergeron, G. and Waters, W. F. Bittersweet Harvest for Global Supermarkets:
Challenges in Latin America’s Export Boom (Washington, DC: Natural Resources Institute,
1995).
Wilson, C. and Tisdell, C. ‘Why farmers continue to use pesticides despite environmental,
health and sustainability costs’, Ecological Economics, Vol. 39, (2001) pp. 449–462.
Wooldridge, J. M. Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data (Cambridge: The
MIT Press, 2002).
Appendix
Table A1
Estimates of pesticide use and revenue function (OLS)
Variable
Domestic and export vegetable
producers Export vegetable producers only
Pesticide use Revenue function Pesticide use Revenue function
Estimated
coefﬁcient
Stand.
error
Estimated
coefﬁcient
Stand.
error
Estimated
coefﬁcient
Stand.
Error
Estimated
coefﬁcient
Stand.
error
ADOP )0.11* 0.92 0.31*** 0.09
CRTY 0.17 0.09 0.49** 0.08
PEPR 0.70*** 0.02 0.14*** 0.03
FEPR )0.07*** 0.00 )0.03*** 0.001
AGEH )0.01 0.00 )0.30** 0.15 )0.01** 0.00 )0.22* 0.17
HHSI )0.05* 0.03 )0.05* 0.02
PRES 0.07** 0.03 0.04 0.03
CONT 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.02
GROU 0.20* 0.02 0.04 0.02
SYPT 0.04* 0.04 0.05* 0.03
FACI )0.14 0.09 )0.27*** 0.10
TRAI )0.06* 0.01 )0.02 0.02
DIST 0.10*** 0.02 0.05** 0.02
CRED 0.00* 0.00 0.00 0.00
APPL 0.42*** 0.15 0.39*** 0.16
FERL )0.01 0.02 0.03 0.02
SEED 0.11** 0.02 0.23*** 0.06
FERT 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.07
LABO 0.31*** 0.06 0.37*** 0.08
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Table A1
(Continued)
Variable
Domestic and export vegetable
producers Export vegetable producers only
Pesticide use Revenue function Pesticide use Revenue function
Estimated
coefﬁcient
Stand.
error
Estimated
coefﬁcient
Stand.
error
Estimated
coefﬁcient
Stand.
Error
Estimated
coefﬁcient
Stand.
error
CRNU 0.09 0.10 0.26** 0.13
PRPR 0.24*** 0.06 0.20*** 0.04
IRRI 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.03
MARK )0.15* 0.08 )0.12* 0.06
FERL 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.02
DISTRICTS
MERU
(reference)
KIRINYAGA )0.19* 0.19 )0.16 0.14 )0.19* 0.22 )0.45** 0.14
MURANGA 0.10 0.30 )0.62** 0.17 0.68** 0.38 )0.40 0.22
NYERI )0.02 0.18 0.10 0.14 0.12 0.21 )0.10 0.22
MAKUENI )0.67** 0.28 0.32* 0.21 )0.97*** 0.40 0.44* 0.09
Damage function
Constant (k) 0.42** 0.24 0.45**
PEST 0.01** 0.00 0.10*
Number of
observations
539 539 439 439
R-square ⁄
Adj. R-square
0.32 ⁄ 0.27 0.39 ⁄ 0.36 0.39 ⁄ 0.33 0.35 ⁄ 0.31
Note: Statistical signiﬁcance at the 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**) and 0.1 (*) level of probability.
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